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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND
COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY:
AN OVERVIEW
by Philip D. Gould* and Patricia H. Murrell**
INTRODUCTION
I have no doubt that if the records of the time of... Hammurabi,
could be completely restored, we should learn that in the third
millennium before Christ men were complaining about the ineffi-
ciency of legal procedure, and... if any of you are destined in the
year 7000 A.D.... to examine and write a monograph... upon
the condition of human law courts, you will be obliged to re-
port... that mankind still exhibits the same discontentment with
its methods of adjusting human differences that you know today.1
-Judge Learned Hand
These words of Judge Learned Hand to the New York City Bar
Association resonate with increasing vigor eighty years after they
were first delivered. The traditional underpinnings of the Ameri-
can legal system are under constant pressure to produce outcomes
consistent with everyday life or "common sense."'2 The system is
criticized for failing to incorporate "real world" procedures into le-
gal education and giving slavish devotion to a set of calcified rules
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has served on the Economics of Law Practice Committee of the Arkansas Bar
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** Patricia H. Murrell is a professor of leadership at the University of Memphis,
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1. Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter,
Address before the New York City Bar Association (Nov. 17, 1921), in 3 LECrURES
ON LEGAL Topics 89 (1926).
2. See generally Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in
Public Opinion, Jokes and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805 (discussing gen-
erally the decline of trust by the public in lawyers and the results they obtain).
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that isolate the contact between the litigation participants and the
legal system.3 This perceived gap between legal conclusions and
life experience has been partially attributed to a system of legal
education that produces professionals prepared primarily for ad-
versarial litigation.4
Some lawyers and judges remain untrained, unprepared, or un-
willing to deal with litigants' life experiences. Segments of the liti-
gants' lives not directly relevant to the litigation are excluded from
consideration. Post-litigation consequences to litigants' lives are
similarly omitted.5 Also neglected are individuals who are not par-
ties to the litigation, but who are of importance to the incident that
gave rise to the litigation. 6 Therapeutic jurisprudence attempts to
take all of these factors into account.
Among the many ideas that have become deeply rooted in the
existing legal system is the view that a court should be a relatively
passive decision maker, utilizing existing law found in statutes or
case law precedent to fashion an applicable remedy. Courts are
specifically discouraged from considering the emotional context of
a particular case or the immediate post-decision future of the par-
ties.7 However, the legal system cannot afford to ignore these
considerations.
The idea that the judiciary has a separate and independent role
in governance has been, ab initio, part of American jurisprudential
fundamentalism.8 Alexander Hamilton, arguing for the adoption
of the Federal Constitution, noted the importance of judicial inde-
pendence and public support for the legal system:
! 3. Michael L. Perlin, Stepping Outside the Box: Viewing Your Client in a Whole
New Light, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 68 (2000) (positing that the current legal education
method fails in training students to ignore the effects the law in question had, and the
resulting litigation will have, on the litigants and others). Susan Daicoff has described
the postmodern paradox of the relationship between society and the legal system,
identifying a "tripartite crisis" consisting of low public opinion of legal practitioners,
lawyer dissatisfaction, and deprofessionalism. Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Within the Comprehensive Law Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEU-
TIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 466 (Dennis P. Stolle et. al.
eds., 2000). These all occur at a time when society is dependent on the adversarial
system to resolve disputes. Id.
4. Perlin, supra note 3, at 66-67.
5. See, e.g., Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, Creating a Domestic Vio-
lence Court: Combat in the Trenches, CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 28 (describing common
results such as increased attacks suffered by domestic violence victims after they bring
initial legal action).
6. Perlin, supra note 3, at 69.
7. Edward A. Dauer, The Power of Myth: A Comment on Des Rosiers' Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence and Appellate Adjudication, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 305 (2000).
8. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Considerate men of every description ought to prize whatever
will tend to beget [integrity and moderation] in the courts; as no
man can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a
spirit of injustice, by that he may be a gainer today. And every
man must now feel that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is
to sap the foundations of public and private confidence and to
introduce in its stead universal distrust and distress.9
Even the decisional independence of judges-their ability to de-
cide cases free from threats of physical violence, financial ruin, or
political pressure, is today severely tested. This is evidenced by in-
cidents involving former New York Federal District Judge Harold
Baer, Jr. and former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny
White. Baer and White were both driven from their benches be-
cause of decisions they made in high profile criminal matters that
appeared before their respective courts.10 Following Justice
White's subsequent loss in her retention election, Tennessee Gov-
ernor Don Sundquist surprisingly remarked, "Should a judge look
over his shoulder [in making decisions] about whether they're go-
ing to be thrown out of office? I hope so.""
Less common are instances of judges leaving the bench because
their personal beliefs conflicted with the strictures of the law. Af-
ter being required to implement a mandatory sentence that con-
flicted with his conscience, New Mexico Supreme Court Justice
Gene Franchini resigned. 12 The contrast between an ideally inde-
pendent judicial branch and the current reality is significant. De-
veloping methods to bridge this rift concerns modern legal
practitioners and judges alike. Therapeutic jurisprudence is one
outcome of these efforts.
This article will first examine the beginnings of the therapeutic
jurisprudence movement, its extension through various areas of the
legal system, and its limitations. Following this discussion, the role
of judges in courts embracing therapeutic jurisprudence will be ex-
amined. This examination will focus on aspects of cognitive theory
developed by William Perry and expanded by Charles Claxton and
Patricia Murrell. Finally, the paper will discuss outcomes resulting
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
10. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Courtroom with a View: Building Judicial Indepen-
dence with Public Participation, 8 WILLAMEITE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RES. 13, 17-19
(2000).
11. Id. at 20.
12. Gene Franchini, Conscience, Judging and Conscientious Judging, 2 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 19, 20-21 (2000).
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from the application of educational theories designed to prepare
judges to assume their roles.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Notions of therapeutic jurisprudence originally arose in the
mental health law context, focusing on the rights of persons ex-
posed to the civil commitment aspect of legal practice. It gradually
expanded to incorporate a therapeutic view of the law.13 As such,
therapeutic jurisprudence has served as a catalyst for interdiscipli-
nary outreach, synthesizing the work of lawyers and judges with
that of criminologists, sociologists, psychologists, philosophers, ed-
ucators, and law professors. 4 The expanded role of legal dispute
resolution through the use of problem-solving techniques is one
strength of the movement, resulting in an increased number of in-
dividuals who possess sufficient skills to engage in the resolution of
those disputes.' 5
The term "therapeutic jurisprudence" is defined as "the study of
the role of law as a therapeutic agent, exploring the extent to which
substantive rules, legal procedures and the role of judges and law-
yers produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.' ' 6
Therapeutic jurisprudence recognizes the limitations on existing le-
gal practice, in which over-reliance on stare decisis and the other
traditions of normative litigation lead to an unsatisfactory result.
Advocates of therapeutic jurisprudence believe that the emotional
context of the case is not only real, but important. In order for a
satisfying resolution to occur the emotional context must be con-
sidered. 7 Failing to take these issues into account leaves only a
partial resolution.
Therefore, the purpose of therapeutic jurisprudence is to aug-
ment current rigid legal processes by taking into account the intan-
gible, emotional states of the parties to the litigation. Therapeutic
jurisprudence seeks to resolve disputes in a manner that addresses
13. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Appellate Arena, 24 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REV. 217, 217-18 (2000).
14. Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, in PRACTICING THERA-
PEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 8.
15. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Culture of Critique, in
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 451.
16. Thomas T. Merrigan, Law in a Therapeutic Key: A Resource for Judges, CT.
REV., Spring 2000, at 8.
17. Daicoff, supra note 3, at 471-72.
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the totality of the parties' needs.' 8 The traditional impartiality of
the judge is made more complex by the addition of subjective em-
pathy to the tools the judge may employ in fashioning decisions.19
Preventive law, originally a separate theoretical discipline, has
allowed both lawyers and judges to put therapeutic principles into
practice.20 By focusing on the needs and interests of the parties,
not just their respective rights, the various sides of the controversy
are aligned. Using existing legal principles and practices as a be-
ginning point, rather than as an end in itself allows the most com-
prehensive solution for the needs of all parties to be constructed.2'
However, there are limitations on the role that therapeutic juris-
prudence can play in dispute resolution. A court's empathy is of
little use in the fact-finding process of the litigation. Determining
whether parties have met the appropriate burden of proof has sig-
nificant consequences for the outcome of the case, but has little to
do with structuring a therapeutic outcome.22
Sometimes the issues presented in a case are difficult, troubling,
far beyond a court's expertise, or so influenced by external forces
that the courtroom may be an inappropriate place to resolve the
dispute. The Elian Gonzalez case, stripped of its international po-
litical features and treated as a case involving the custody of a mi-
nor child, is a pertinent example.23 The Gonzalez case involved a
minor's father, the only surviving biological parent, seeking cus-
tody from his ex-wife's family following her demise.24 The court
held that a parent's residence in a communist-totalitarian state was
not a special circumstance to substantiate consideration of an asy-
lum claim by a six-year-old child, presented by the child's relative
in this country, against the wishes of his parent.25 The case
presents an instance in which a therapeutic outcome would have
been superior to a legally imposed one. While the end result of the
case continues to have many national and international political
repercussions, and while portions of the case had serious short-
term anti-therapeutic effects (such as the methodology used to
18. Wexler, supra note 15, at 455.
19. Nathalie Des Rosiers, The Mythical Power of Myth? A Response to Professor
Dauer, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 307, 307-08 (2000).
20. Daicoff, supra note 3, at 474-75.
21. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Appeal of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 223, 223 (2000).
22. Merrigan, supra note 16, at 9.
23. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1270 (2000).
24. Steve Leben, Thoughts on Some Potential Appellate and Trial Court Applica-
tions of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 467, 469-70 (2000).
25. Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1356.
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transfer physical custody of the child) the reunification of father
and son may, in the long run, turn out to have superior therapeutic
effects on the child.
In other cases, parties refuse to acknowledge the psychological
impact of the litigation on themselves or the opposing party; attor-
neys are not comfortable working in a non-adversarial environ-
ment; or one of the parties is so intractable that the struggle of
contemporary litigation is the only conceivable type of resolution
possible.26 Under these circumstances, the therapeutic jurispru-
dential approach is of little value because cooperation between the
parties and their legal representatives is not possible.
II. THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE
As a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything
else short of sickness and death.27
-Judge Learned Hand
The role of the judge in a therapeutic context is more complex
than mere fact-finding and applying relevant statutes and/or prece-
dents. The judge is often burdened with dealing with the emo-
tional dimensions of the hearing on the litigants and their
attorneys. Parties influenced by the stress of litigation have re-
acted in a primitive "fight or flight" mode.28 Stress hormones are
released throughout the body and the ability to process or recall
information, key functions of all witnesses who testify under oath,
is diminished.29 While an attorney, as the "champion" of the liti-
gant, can help diffuse the stress of the courtroom proceeding, the
role of the other actors, including the judge, is also relevant.30
Judges can help diffuse the stress on the litigants by listening to
the narratives on both sides of the dispute.' Indeed, the simple act
of uncritical, attentive listening by the judge can set the timbre of
26. Daicoff, supra note 3, at 491.
27. This statement by Learned Hand was made well before the advent of contem-
porary law practice. HAND, supra note 1, at 491.
28. Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in Litiga-
tion, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 314.
29. Id. at 309, 312-14.
30. Id.
31. Many psychologists have noted the importance of narrative in human exis-
tence. Robert A. Neimeyer has noted that narrative construction is an archetypal
human activity that "represents ways of seeking continuity of meaning in our lived
experience." Robert A. Neimeyer & Finn Tschudi, Community and Coherence: Nar-
rative Contributions to the Psychology of Conflict and Loss 3, in NARRATIVE AND
CONSCIOUSNESS LITERATURE, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE BRAIN (G. Fireman et. al. eds.,
2002)(unpublished manuscript on file with the authors). In the context of the criminal
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the courtroom proceeding, encouraging both parties to listen to
one another and smoothing the courtroom environment. The trial
itself is almost always the first occasion that either side has had the
opportunity to hear the opposing viewpoint in its entirety. Fur-
thermore, it is not inconceivable that the parties may, upon reflec-
tion, devise their own remedies to the issues involved in the
litigation during the course of the proceeding, thus sparing the fi-
nality of an externally imposed solution.32 By engaging in active
listening, a judge may choose his or her language with greater sen-
sitivity to the essence of the dispute and may select the most appro-
priate remedy under the circumstances.33
It is important that litigants feel not only that their voices are
heard, but also that the trier of fact actually considers their stories.
After the parties recite their stories, the participants often feel vali-
dated. The process then seems voluntary and noncoercive. 34 The
perception of voluntariness is important in obtaining a therapeutic
outcome. It allows the parties to feel that they maintained a mea-
sure of control over their own actions and diminishes the percep-
tions of powerlessness at the hands of a coercive tribunal.
While voice and validation are important to litigants, the percep-
tion of fairness in the process is also important to achieving a ther-
apeutic outcome. The process itself should leave the participants
believing they were treated with fairness, dignity, and respect.
Without this perception of fairness, litigants may feel frustrated,
powerless, or angry. They may even reject the process or the legal
system itself. This rejection can have particularly negative social
consequences, especially in the criminal court setting, where the
failure to achieve a therapeutic outcome may result in the inability
of an individual defendant to reintegrate with society in a meaning-
ful and productive manner.36 On the other hand, it has been shown
that when parties believe the process is fair, they are more likely to
justice system, however, the system often denies the narrative voice of the victim,
whose courthouse role is supplanted by that of the state. Id. at 7-8.
32. Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Telling to Listening: A Therapeutic Analysis of the
Role of Courts in Minority-Majority Conflicts, CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 56.
33. Luis Muniz Arguelles, Yelling Not Telling: An Antitherapeutic Approach Pro-
moting Conflict, 24 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 237, 243-44 (2000).
34. Amy D. Ronner & Bruce J. Winick, Silencing the Appellant's Voice: The An-
titherapeutic Per Curiam Affirmance, 24 SEATrLE U. L. REV 499, 501-03 (2000).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 504-05.
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accept adverse legal decisions.37 Belief in fairness leads to en-
hanced confidence in the judiciary and a willingness to cooperate
with civil court orders even though they are perceived to be
restrictive.38
Courts providing important information to parties in a timely
fashion may also provide litigants with additional therapeutic bene-
fits. Typically, each party's lawyer is the conduit through which in-
formation is relayed from bench to litigant, and the judge fulfills
his or her role by providing accurate information. However, that is
not the only communication channel available to judges. During
the courtroom proceeding, the judge has the opportunity to com-
municate directly with both parties about basic nonlegal issues sur-
rounding the proceeding, without damaging his or her role as an
impartial arbiter. By providing this practical information, such as
the daily schedule or availability of parking, and understanding
that parties to the litigation are likely neophytes to the courtroom,
the court can perform a therapeutic function by reducing stress
caused by the uncertainty of the proceeding.3 9
Judges should not overlook the therapeutic value of simultane-
ous multiparty communication.40 In many cases, the court is the
only entity with sufficient ability to fashion a resolution to out-
standing issues and convince or coerce parties to change.4' In a
court seeking therapeutic outcomes, the final judgment of the case
is not intended to be a static one. Instead, it is process-oriented,
intending to resolve the dispute between parties over time. The
court builds the framework for a continued relationship between
the parties.42 A highly desirable therapeutic outcome is one in
which the parties learn how to preserve their existing relationship
while also learning how to resolve their future conflicts without re-
petitive judicial intervention. 43 As a result of the creation of spe-
cialty courts that apply principles of the new therapeutic
jurisprudence, judges become more acquainted with the persons
who come before them than judges in conventional courts. The
37. David B. Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require Special-
ized Courts (and Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist Judges)?, CT. REV., Spring
2000, at 26.
38. Id.
39. Winick, supra note 28, at 313.
40. Des Rosiers, supra note 32, at 56.
41. Roberto P. Aponte Toro, Noriega v. Hernandez Colon: Political Persecution
Under Therapeutic Scrutiny, 24 SEArrLE U. L. REV 555, 564-65 (2000).
42. Dauer, supra note 7, at 303.
43. Des Rosiers, supra note 32, at 56.
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judge becomes teacher, counselor, parent, cheerleader, and
coach.44 In these roles, it is easy for the court to be uncharacteristi-
cally paternalistic. To avoid this type of judicial overreaching, the
structures of the existing legal system must be relied on to limit the
powers of the courts.45
III. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND THE JURIST
With this new, greatly expanded role for the judge, the levels of
cognitive functioning that would characterize the ideal therapeutic
judge should be given some consideration. Stage development the-
ories offer a lens through which this can be accomplished. These
theories attempt to explain how people cope with the challenges of
their lives. Each stage presents particular intellectual tasks a per-
son must master before moving to the next stage. Issues, however,
are not resolved "once and for all," but must be revisited as life
circumstances change. In fact, as persons mature, they discover
their way of thinking may be at odds with experience and the les-
sons derived from it. The resulting disequilibrium and dissonance
require a transition to the next stage.46
William Perry's scheme of intellectual and ethical development
offers one description of the stages through which people move as
their ways of thinking change.4 7 His scheme describes the way in-
dividuals process information and interpret the world outside of
themselves-including peers, knowledge, the environment, and au-
thority-in addition to addressing the processes used in decision-
making. Each stage represents a qualitatively more complex way
of thinking. 8
Perry's work is beginning to influence decisions regarding legal
education. Paul Wangerin, associate professor of law at John Mar-
shall Law School, stated that: "William Perry ... describes a cogni-
tive development sequence in the intellectual abilities of young
adults that can readily be used to catalogue the various develop-
mental phases through which many law students seem to pass," and
links Perry's ideas to law school students anecdotally and, indi-
44. Deborah J. Chase & Peggy Fulton Hora, The Implications of Therapeutic Ju-
risprudence for Judicial Satisfaction, CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 12.
45. Sol Gothard, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Appellate Arena-A Louisiana
Jurist's Response, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 335, 338 (2000).
46. See generally WILLIAM G. PERRY, JR., FORMS OF ETHICAL AND INTELLEC-
TUAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLLEGE YEARS: A SCHEME (1999).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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rectly, empirically.49 More recently, Carnegie Scholar Jane H.
Aiken, a law professor at Washington University School of Law,
utilized Perry's work to help law students develop higher order
thinking skills in order to arrive at what she terms "justice readi-
ness. ''5u Perry's work also has been used extensively' with state
judges in the Leadership Institute in Judicial Education, a State
Justice Institute-funded program conducted at the University of
Memphis.51
Thinkers in the first stage of Perry's model tend to see the world
from two diametrically opposing perspectives: good/bad or right/
wrong.5" In the dualistic thinker's mind, there exists a definitive
resolution to every situation, and the job of the judge is to discover
and apply this resolution, leading to a winner-take-all mindset.
The judge applies existing law to determine the future of the par-
ties in a sterile, objective fashion.53 Aiken assumes that most of
her learners are beyond this dichotomous stage. She observes,
however, that the shock of law school and its traditional teaching
methods often drive students to embrace this dualistic 'thinking at
the start of law school, 54 and Wangerin acknowledges the fre-
quency of dualism observed in first year law school students.55
Judges, particularly those who are new on the bench, may also ini-
tially revert to dualistic thinking as they struggle to master the
competencies needed for their role.
In the second stage of the Perry scheme, the multiplistic thinking
stage, judges recognize that there may be several divergent "right"
alternatives and that they must pick among several competing op-
tions. This selection process is relatively uncritical, with all the
right answers seen as being of equal value. 56 As Aiken observes,
multiplistic thinkers come to appreciate that awareness is con-
structed, but believe that no ethical or moral principles exist within
such constructions. 57 Judges in this developmental stage have diffi-
49. See generally Paul Wangerin, Objective, Multiplistic, and Relative Truth in De-
velopmental Psychology and Legal Education, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1237 (1988).
50. Jane Aiken, Teaching "Justice Readiness:" A Developmental Approach to Le-
gal Education, 10 NAT. TEACHING AND LEARNING F. 1, 1-3 (2001).
51. See generally Charles S. Claxton & Patricia H. Murrell, Education for Develop-
ment: Principles and Practices in Judicial Education, The Judicial Education Refer-
ence, Information and Technical Transfer Project Monograph Three, 1992.
52. See generally PERRY, supra note 46.
53. See generally Daicoff, supra note 3, at 473.
54. Aiken, supra note 50, at 1-5.
55. See generally Wangerin, supra note 49, at 1247.
56. See generally PERRY supra note 46.
57. See Aiken, supra note 50, at 1-5.
2126
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
culty formulating therapeutic outcomes because instead of merely
picking a single option from equal competing alternatives, thera-
peutic jurisprudence requires an analysis of the alternatives to de-
termine which is best, considering all the elements parties bring to
the litigation. The best solution may not be a single option, but
rather multiple options or a blending of options. In addition, the
facts may be relatively unimportant to the multiplistic thinkers be-
cause of the perception that all options are equally valid. In con-
trast, the therapeutic jurist must engage in intense fact-finding to
insure that the remedy formed is the best in this context.
The major changes in individual development in the Perry
framework occur between these initial stages and the final two
stages when the locus of authority as perceived by the individual
shifts from external entities to oneself.58 From the perspective of
therapeutic jurisprudence, the locus of judging authority, as per-
ceived by the judge, would shift from the law books, regulation
manuals, and volumes of decisions, to his or her court and the spe-
cific case to be decided. This developmental shift may occur when
the judge encounters complex problems where the law and justice
do not seem in accord.
At the next level of the Perry scheme, the relativistic stage of
development, the self assumes legitimacy. 59 Here therapeutic ju-
rists can begin to explore their judging options. In fact, judges at
this stage of development begin to analyze critically, not only the
multiple alternatives facing them, but their own conflicting
thoughts as well. Relativistic thinkers are capable of metacogni-
tion, the process of thinking about one's thinking.6 ° Judges at this
stage of cognitive development use the parties' courtroom
presentations as a form of dialogue to assist them in clarifying their
own mental processes. The parameters of an appropriate remedy
can then be shaped. All choices are not equally valid to relativistic
thinkers and context assumes a more prominent role. At this level
of the Perry scheme, the ability to empathize with the plight of
others is realized.6 Since empathy is an essential component of
therapeutic jurisprudence, it is critical for judges to achieve this
stage of development.
58. See generally PERRY supra note 46.
59. Id.
60. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 237
(2000).
61. See generally PERRY supra note 46.
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Ideally, however, the therapeutic judge will reach the highest
stage of the Perry scheme, the level of commitment.6 2 At this level,
the judge can most effectively balance the requirements of the le-
gal system with the needs of the parties before him or her. A ther-
apeutic court will know more about the individuals before it than
other courts, because the knowledge of the individual parties is es-
sential to crafting an appropriate remedy. That knowledge, how-
ever, will never be complete or perfect. A therapeutic judge
operating at the level of commitment is able to accept this imper-
fect knowledge, with its ambiguities and paradoxes, and cautiously
proceed toward the goal of achieving the best possible resolution
of the matter.63 This issue presents an imperfect, but workable res-
olution, that over time will improve as the therapeutic court contin-
ues its monitoring function and becomes more familiar with all
involved parties. The judge's level of commitment may be the re-
sult of his or her recognition that the "law is not neutral and the
playing field is not level."6 At the stage of commitment a judge is
able to identify assumptions and the effect of those assumptions on
choices and behavior.
Moreover, Claxton and Murrell have developed several attrib-
utes of "highly developed people," based on the Perry scheme and
other models, which may be applied to the desired profile of the
therapeutic judge.6 5 These attributes are thinking in complex ways;
possessing a high level of competence; accepting responsibility for
themselves, including accepting the consequences of their own ac-
tions; accepting their own experience as the best guide for their
actions; being consistently and tenaciously authentic; and commit-
ting to goals that transcend their own immediate needs and situa-
tions.66 All of these attributes are consistent with the level that
judges need to reach to successfully implement therapeutic juris-
prudential principles in their courtrooms.
IV. PROGRESS TOWARD THERAPEUTIC JUDICIAL RESOLUTIONS
Changes have occurred in the way that courts hear cases and the
way that solutions are crafted. This change is driven by increasing
caseloads, dissatisfied judges and lawyers, and alienated members
of the general public. Therapeutic jurisprudence provides a theo-
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Aiken, supra note 50, at 1-5.
65. See generally Claxton & Murrell, supra note 51.
66. Id.
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retical underpinning that allows decisions to be constructed on a
case-by-case basis, while using the existing legal parameters of pre-
cedent and statute as guides and limitations on court paternalism.
Increasingly, therapeutic jurisprudence is a topic of judicial educa-
tion programs.67
Judicial satisfaction surveys similarly reveal that judges are more
satisfied with process outcomes when therapeutic approaches are
applied. 68 By seeking to include the community, judges are able to
build bridges to the public by acting as educators and showing how
the judicial system is an effective part of government. As a result
of these outreach efforts, there is increased public support.69
Attorneys who encourage their clients to adapt to the litigation
process and who actively assist the court in fashioning a suitable
remedy appear to have higher levels of satisfaction with the pro-
cess. These attorneys are freed from the winner-take-all mentality
of conventional litigation.7 °
There are limitations on the effective use of therapeutic jurispru-
dence, as the foregoing discussion has shown, and more limitations
will appear as the approach is applied more frequently to litigation.
Nonetheless, therapeutic jurisprudence can provide effective dis-
pute resolution and, in the future, may help reduce the alienation
between the system and the public, while reducing the burgeoning
caseload of the courts. Therapeutic jurisprudence is an idea whose
time has come.
V. PARTIES AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
Obviously, the judge is not the only one in the courtroom to
whom this description of cognitive development applies. The par-
ties involved in court proceedings are also at different levels in
their own cognitive development. The party to litigation is a rela-
tively passive participant, who depends on the court for instruction
in what to do. There is little chance to assume responsibility, and a
successful therapeutic solution will need to include opportunities
for the party to develop a more internal locus of control. A drug
court participant, for example, may begin to rebuild his or her own
life, given encouragement and support by the court, while continu-
ing to be aware of the court's sanctioning power. An ideal out-
67. Abrahamson, supra note 21, at 223-24.
68. Chase & Hora, supra note 44, at 13.
69. Linda M. McGee, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Appellate Courts, 24 SE-
ATrLE U. L. REV. 477, 478 (2000).
70. Winick, supra note 28, at 324.
2002] 2129
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
come of the proceeding would be that parties begin to similarly
internalize their own loci of authority and proceed in such a man-
ner as to minimize further legal intervention. Note that the court
does not relieve the parties of the burden of solving their own
problem. It becomes an active participant in the resolution pro-
cess, directing the scope of the resolution. By requiring the parties
to take a hand in the resolution of their difficulties, the court en-
courages them to reach higher levels of cognitive development.7'
The parties, in reaching this higher stage of development, would
hopefully see the court not as an arbiter of rules, but as an engineer
of suitable remedies for their particular situation. Decisions
reached through a therapeutic jurisprudence process have a better
chance of encouraging cognitive development on the part of liti-
gants if they see the court modeling a problem-solving method.
VI. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AS AN OUTCOME FOR
JUDICIAL EDUCATION
Assuming that judges who function at the stage of relativism or
commitment will experience greater satisfaction and greater suc-
cess in courts with a therapeutic orientation, the question is
whether judicial education can be designed in such a way as to pro-
mote the cognitive and intellectual development of judges. A cur-
riculum that attends to the following four areas offers a starting
place:
1. Substantive content-legal material or information in areas
such as substance abuse.
2. Skills- application of technology in the judge's work or
skills in interviewing.
3. Personal authenticity-judicial philosophy such as therapeu-
tic jurisprudence or an area such as ethics or emotional
intelligence.
4. Personal growth-stress management, wellness, retirement
planning, or diversity.
A program that balances these four areas recognizes that judicial
education should address the needs of the organization-in this
case the courts-as well as the needs of the individual judge.
In addition to program content, the processes by which the mate-
rial is presented can also be utilized to promote cognitive develop-
ment along a scheme such as Perry's. Both curricular content and
teaching processes can provide sources of challenge and support
71. See Neimeyer & Tschudi, supra note 31, at 6-8.
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for learners. Challenge is essential to create the dissonance and dis-
equilibrium necessary for growth; support is necessary to prevent
disengaging.72
Learning processes can be designed that encourage cognitive
complexity. Demonstrations, simulations, and activities such as
role playing, case studies, films, or guest speakers that address per-
sonal experiences can provide the judges with concrete experiences.
Small group discussions, journal writing, asking for judges' reac-
tions, and formulating questions gives learners the opportunity to
engage in reflection. Lectures that present concepts or authorita-
tive information, research presentations, and print sources en-
courage abstract conceptualization. Hypothetical or "what if"
situations, devising plans of action, practice sessions, or problem-
solving activities afford the judge opportunities for active experi-
mentation. Combining activities from each of these four categories
has the power to promote more complex thinking and higher levels
of cognitive development.73
Making cognitive development an explicit outcome of judicial
education demands that we create a trusting environment where
participants feel safe to engage in reflection and introspection. The
authors of Common Fire describe such an environment as a "clear
space, contemplative time, and good conversation to engage and
understand complex problems. 74
CONCLUSION
No problem can be solved from the same consciousness that cre-
ated it. We must learn to see the world anew.
-Albert Einstein
If we are to solve the problems facing the courts today, a new
level of consciousness must be developed. If the law is truly "cul-
turally constructed, ' 75 then the methodologies of the past must
change, perhaps even beyond the vision of distinguished jurists of
the past. Therapeutic jurisprudence provides a rubric that allows
principles and disciplines outside the legal profession to augment
the way courts resolve disputes. Current issues reflect the extreme
complexity of our world, with its nanosecond-based technology and
72. See generally ROBERT KEGAN, IN OVER OUR HEADS: THE MENTAL DE-
MANDS OF MODERN LIFE 42 (1994).
73. See generally DAVID A. KOLB, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING (1984).
74. LAURENT A. PARKS DALOZ ET AL., COMMON FIRE: LEADING LIVES OF COM-
MITMENT IN A COMPLEX WORLD (1996).
75. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 60, at 226.
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global outlook. An array of specialized, problem-solving courts
most effectively address these issues. In order for the courts to
work effectively, they must be presided over by judges whose cog-
nitive capability is equally complex. Cognitive development be-
comes not only a positive thing to strive for, but also something on
which the health and survival of our legal system depends.
